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A.

VAN GRAAFEILANDt

W

HEN the Articles Editor invited me to write an article on
sentencing, he informed me that the format would be informal and that footnotes were not required. I wasn't sure whether
this was a carrot on the stick approach or simply a tacit recognition of the fact that the involvement of federal court of appeals
judges in the sentencing process has been minimal and, therefore, perhaps not too enlightening. For many years, my colleagues and I have followed the Supreme Court's admonition that
our sole role on an appeal from a sentence was to determine
whether the sentence was imposed in a proper manner and fell
within the statutory guidelines.' With the advent of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,2 this is about to change.
It seems like only yesterday that Justice Black, writing for the
Supreme Court, stated that the "modem philosophy of penology
[is] that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely
the crime," and that "[t]he belief no longer prevails that every
offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment
without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender." 3 "Retribution," Justice Black continued, "is no longer
the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal
4
jurisprudence."
Although only thirty-seven years have passed since those
words were written, we are now instructed that the beliefs they
t Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
A.B., Univ. of Rochester, 1937; LL.B., Cornell Univ., 1940.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Keuylian, 602 F.2d 1033, 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
2. PUB. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984). The Act amends the sentencing provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code.

3. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
4. Id. at 248.
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espoused are, to use a well-worn legal phrase, clearly erroneous.
The principal aims of sentencing now are said to be retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation and uniformity. 5 Realization of these
aims is the specific goal of the Sentencing Reform Act. Imprison6
ment for purposes of rehabilitation is considered inappropriate.
Briefly summarized, the Act, which is not yet fully effective,
provides for the creation of a Sentencing Commission, which is to
promulgate guidelines for the courts to use in sentencing, together with policy statements regarding the application of the
guidelines and related matters. 7 The guidelines are intended to
cover the various categories of offenses as they involve various
categories of offenders." Trial judges are instructed to impose
sentences of the kind and within the range established by the Sentencing Commission for each applicable category, unless aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist which call for a departure
from the pertinent guideline. 9 The Commission, in turn, is instructed to formulate its guidelines for imprisonment so that the
maximum term does not exceed the minimum by more than
twenty-five percent of the minimum or six months, whichever is
greater, except that, if the guideline calls for a maximum sentence
of life imprisonment, the minimum must be at least thirty years.' 0
Parole is effectively abolished."
In September 1986, the Sentencing Commission issued a
preliminary draft of its proposed sentencing guidelines for the
purposes of securing public analysis and comment. Putting it
mildly, the response to date has been less than enthusiastic. Undaunted by the truism that "[n]ature never rhymes her children,
nor makes two men alike,"' 12 the Commission stated that its goal
was "to provide a structure and framework for the sentencing decision so that similar offenders who commit similar offenses are
sentenced in a similar fashion." Reacting perhaps to the modern
generation's fascination with numbers, the Commission seeks to
attain this goal by means of mathematical computations. An anal5. H.R. REP. No. 1030 and S. REP. No. 634, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 75-76,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3182, 3258-59.
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (Supp. III 1985).
7. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. III 1985).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (Supp. III 1985).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2).
11. PUB. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2027 (1984).
12. R.W. EMERSON, Essay on Character, ESSAYS, FIRST AND SECOND SERIES
324-44 (1951).
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ysis of the proposed guidelines is beyond the scope of this brief
article. Moreover, since changes are inevitable, a detailed discussion at this time would be premature. However, since the thrust
of the Commission's proposals probably will not vary a great deal,
some generalizations presently can be made.
In assigning to the Commission the task of creating guidelines, Congress insisted that the guidelines be "entirely neutral as
to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status
of offenders," 1 3 and that they "reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment
record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the
defendant."' 4 These instructions have led the Commission to
concentrate more on the nature and extent of the injury or harm
resulting from the defendant's acts than on the nature of the offense and the defendant's character and mental processes. The
guidelines group offenses into a number of broad categories, for
example, "Offenses Involving the Person", "Offenses Involving
Property", etc., and assign to each a basic offense point value.
The sentencing judge is instructed to modify the basic offense
value by looking not only to the offense for which a conviction
was obtained but also to the conduct or harms committed in furtherance of that offense, i.e., to look at the complete picture of
the defendant's wrongdoing. This is to be accomplished by referring to so-called "Special Offense Characteristics" and "Cross
References" listed for each offense and adding whatever points
are called for in these subchapters.
The sentencing judge is instructed to then modify the total
offense value score by looking to certain so-called "Offender
Characteristics," which assign numerical multiples for such things
as the defendant's role in the offense, his criminal history, his
post-offense conduct, etc. The length of the defendant's sentence
is determined by reference to a table which provides a maximum
and minimum period of incarceration for the final point total.
The consensus of most knowledgeable critics is that the
Commission's sentencing by the numbers approach is too depersonalized, too complicated, too punitive, and too burdensome of
application. In a public statement, in which most of the Second
Circuit judges joined, the above-described use of rigid mathematical values was said to have reduced the discretion of the sentencing judge "almost to the point where the sentencing process
13. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (Supp. III 1985).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (Supp. III 1985).
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could be performed by a computer or an accountant." A report
by a subcommittee member of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York stated that the "quest for scientific precision is
illusory and dangerous."
Assuming that the fairness or unfairness of such a mechanical
process is, in the first instance at least, a matter for Congress
rather than the courts, the effect of the process upon the courts is
a matter of direct judicial concern. Although it is too early to
make a factually supportable appraisal of the guidelines' almost
complete overthrow of existing sentencing law, it can be safely
predicted that the guidelines, as presently contemplated, will impose a massive additional burden on the courts, particularly at the
appellate level.
Congress clearly intended that the courts of appeals should
take an active role in overseeing sentencing. Congress felt that
appellate review is essential "to assure that the guidelines are applied properly and to provide case law development of the appropriate reasons for sentencing outside the guidelines."i 15
Appellate pronouncements also are expected to assist the Sentencing Commission in determining whether its guidelines are being implemented effectively and whether they should be revised if
they have failed to achieve their intended purposes. 16
In providing for review, Congress has attempted to distinguish between sentences resulting from incorrect application of
the guidelines and sentences that are outside the range of applicable guidelines. The Act provides that either the government or
the defendant may appeal a sentence imposed in violation of law
or as the result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines. 17 A defendant may appeal a sentence that is greater
than that prescribed in the guidelines and specified in a plea
agreement, if any; the government may appeal when the sentence
is less than that provided in the guidelines and in a plea bargaining agreement, if any.is The facts needed to quantify the Special
Offense Characteristics, Cross References, and Offender Characteristics which are used to modify the basic offense value must be
established by a preponderance of the evidence. Sentencing
15. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3182, 3334.
16. Id. at 3361.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Appeals by a defendant are governed by subsection
(a) of § 3742, while government appeals are governed by subsection (b). The
grounds for review are the same for both. Compare § 3742(a)(1)-(4) with.
§ 3742(b)(1)-(4).
18. Id.
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hearings in this area will proliferate and appeals inevitably will
follow. Because the trial court always must state the reasons for
the sentence it has imposed, 19 reasons that will be reviewable by
an appellate court, a completely new body of sentencing law is
almost certain to result.
The expressed intent of Congress is to create a sentencing
guidelines system that will eliminate sentencing disparities. 20 In
discussing the so-called "shameful disparity" that presently exiStS,21 Congress returns time and again to the subject of white
collar crimes. 2 2 Unfortunately, some federal crimes, particularly
white collar crimes, do not lend themselves readily to uniform
classification.
One need review only a few of the cases decided under the
mail fraud statute 23 to appreciate the varieties of culpability possible under that law. The liberal construction policy followed by
the courts has changed this statute from one of limited objectives
to a general prohibition of conduct "which fails to match the 'reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play
and right dealing in the general and business life of members of
society.' "24 Numerical classification of violations which will eliminate sentencing disparity under this statute is an almost impossible task. The nine Specific Offense Characteristics and one Cross
Reference applicable to the "Offenses Involving Fraud and Deception" category of the guidelines, which is made applicable to
mail fraud, are neither sufficiently flexible nor adequate for this
purpose.
The conspiracy statute 2 5 presents a similar problem. This
statute makes it unlawful to conspire to violate another criminal
statute or to defraud the United States, even though a specific
criminal statute has not been violated. Indeed, the statute makes
it unlawful to conspire to commit any offense which Congress has
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (Supp. 11 1984).

20. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3182, 3234.
21. Id. at 3248.
22. See, e.g., id. at 3259, 3260. Referring to the deterrent purpose of sentencing, the legislative history states: "Major white collar criminals often are
sentenced to small fines and little or no imprisonment. Unfortunately, this creates the impression that certain offenses are punishable only by a small fine that
can be written off as a cost of doing business." Id. at 3259.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
24. United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 545 (7th Cir.) (quoting Blachly v.
United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967)), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976
(1976); see United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 23 (2d Cir. 1983) (Winter, J.,
dissenting).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
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prohibited in the interest of public policy, even though the offense itself is not a criminal act. As Justice Holmes said in Drew v.
Thaw, 2 6 "[i]t is perfectly possible and even may be rational to enact that a conspiracy to accomplish what an individual is free to do
shall be a crime." 2 7 We may anticipate increased litigation in
these areas, both at the trial and appellate levels.
Constitutional issues likewise will not be lacking when the
guidelines become effective. For example, the Act provides that
the controlling guidelines are those in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced rather than on the date of the crime. 28 Undoubtedly, someone will contend that this provision violates the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. It may be
that Congress is placing unjustified reliance upon cases upholding the applicability of changes in parole guidelines to defendants
already sentenced. 29 The Parole Commission's decision whether
or not to grant parole is not part of the sentencing process.30
The sentencing guidelines, as their name implies, appear to be an
intrinsic part of that process. If the guidelines at the time of sentencing are more onerous than those in effect when the crime was
committed, there may be merit in the argument that they violate
the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. 3 '
When the Supreme Court held in Solem v. Helm 32 that claims
of disproportionate excessiveness justified appellate review of
sentences, ChiefJustice Burger, quotingJudge Friendly, wrote in
dissent that "[t]o require appellate review of all sentences of imprisonment-as the Court's opinion necessarily does-will 'administer the coup de grace to the courts of appeals as we know
them.' "33 Although I think it unlikely that the sentencing guide26. 235 U.S. 432 (1914).
27. Id. at 438; see also United States v. Hutto, 256 U.S. 524, 528-29 (1921)
(combination of two or more persons to accomplish criminal or otherwise unlawful purpose comes within accepted definitions of conspiracy); United States
v. Wiesner, 216 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1954) (conspiracy statute does not preclude indictment of person for conspiracy to commit non-criminal offense).
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (Supp. 11 1984).
29. See 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3182, 3260-61.
30. Dioguardi v. United States, 587 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1978); see also
Portley v. Grossman, 444 U.S. 1311 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.) (in chambers denial
of application for stay).
31. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-31 (1980) (ex post facto prohibition forbids any law imposing punishment for act not punishable at time committed or imposing additional punishment to that then prescribed); see also H.R.
REP. No. 614, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 n.3, nrprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1762, 1763.
32. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
33. Id. at 315.
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lines will have such a disastrous effect, I agree with my Second
Circuit colleagues that the proposed new procedure will impose a
"massive additional burden" on the courts and that there will be a
substantial increase in the number of appeals. Moreover, at least
during the shakedown period of the guidelines, many of these appeals will have to be decided by citable, interpretative opinions.
This obviously will place a heavy burden on already
overburdened courts of appeals. Should the Sentencing Reform
Act's goal of uniformity and certainty even be reached, there may
well be a substantial decrease in the number of cases disposed of
by pleas. An indicted defendant then should be able to anticipate
what guidelines will control his sentence if he goes to trial, and it
appears to be the congressional intent that judges examine plea
agreements to make certain that prosecutors have not used plea
bargaining to undermine those applicable guidelines. 34 If the
congressional intent prevails, we may anticipate a reduction in the
number of guilty and nolo contendere pleas by defendants, who
know that they have nothing to lose by going to trial, and a corresponding increase in the number of trials and appeals.
There is reason to doubt, however, that the Sentencing Reform Act's aim of consistent, non-disparate punishment ever will
be realized completely. Americans are more inclined to be
merciful than vindictive, and this is as true of most judges as it is
of most laymen. Departures from the guidelines by such judges
3 5
will not be overturned unless the departures are unreasonable,
and appellate courts probably will continue to show substantial
deference to the decisions of the sentencing judge. Those who
favor the new punitive and depersonalized concept of sentencing
should of course be concerned with whether the courts will be
able to handle the heavier burden it imposes upon them and
whether already overcrowded federal prisons can accommodate
the inevitable increase in inmate population. However, additional
judges can be appointed, and new courthouses and prisons can be
built. The more basic concern, as I see it, is whether judges, who
deal with human beings, not numbers, are prepared to operate on
the theory that disparity is "shameful" and to apply the sentencing guidelines in the literal fashion that the Commission apparently intends.
34. 1984 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD. NEWS 3182, 3246.

35. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d)(3).
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